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Daphne Gilbert*  Faith and/in Medicine: Religious and
 Conscientious Objections to MAiD
Across Canada, health care institutions that operate under the umbrella of religious 
traditions refuse to offer medical assistance in dying (MAiD) on the grounds that it 
violates their Charter-protected rights to freedom of religion and conscience.  This 
article analyses the Supreme Court jurisprudence on section 2(a) and concludes 
that it should not extend to the protection of institutional rights. While the Court has 
not definitively pronounced a view on this matter, its jurisprudence suggests that any 
institutional right to freedom of religion would not extend to decisions on publicly-funded 
and legal health care. MAiD is a constitutionally-protected option for individuals and 
both courts and governments should prioritize an individual’s right to access health 
care over any institutional considerations. Health care regulatory bodies already offer 
individual health care practitioners the compromise of making an effective referral to a 
non-objecting colleague in matters that implicate conscientious or religious objections. 
Institutions may be filled with people, but they are built of bricks and mortar. The 
institutions themselves should not take a moral stance on this complex social issue. 
They most certainly should not take an oppositional position to the Charter-protected 
rights of patients. The author concludes that provincial governments across this country 
must appreciate their duty to be neutral on matters of conscience and religion and take 
strong leadership roles in making clear to publicly-funded institutions that they must not 
deny medical services solely on religious or conscientious grounds.
Dans tout le Canada, des établissements de soins de santé qui fonctionnent sous 
l’égide de traditions religieuses refusent d’offrir l’assistance médicale à mourir au 
motif que cela viole leur droit à la liberté de religion et de conscience protégé par la 
Charte. Dans le présent article, nous analysons la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême 
relative à l’alinéa 2a) et concluons qu’elle ne devrait pas s’étendre à la protection des 
droits des établissements. Bien que la Cour ne se soit pas définitivement prononcée 
sur cette question, sa jurisprudence indique que le droit à la liberté de religion d’un 
établissement ne saurait s’étendre aux décisions relatives aux soins de santé légaux 
et financés par l’État. L’assistance médicale à mourir est une option protégée par la 
Constitution et les tribunaux comme les gouvernements devraient donner la priorité 
au droit d’une personne d’y accéder. Les organismes de réglementation des soins de 
santé offrent déjà aux praticiens le compromis de référer un patient à un collègue non 
objecteur dans les cas d’objections de conscience ou religieuses. Les établissements 
peuvent être remplis de personnes, mais ils sont construits de briques et de mortier. 
Les établissements eux-mêmes ne devraient pas adopter une position morale sur cette 
question sociale complexe. Ils ne devraient certainement pas s’opposer au respect des 
droits des patients protégés par la Charte. L’auteur conclut que les gouvernements 
provinciaux de tout le pays doivent tenir compte de leur devoir de neutralité sur les 
questions de conscience et de religion et assumer un rôle de leadership fort en indiquant 
clairement aux établissements financés par l’État qu’ils ne doivent pas refuser des 
services médicaux uniquement pour des raisons religieuses ou de conscience.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Common Law Section). I am 
grateful to Jocelyn Downie and Stefanie Green for conversations and inspiration that greatly improved 
the final version of this article.  Thank you to Constance MacIntosh for the opportunity to present 
this work at the Health Law Speaker’s Series at Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University.  I 
depended on the research assistance of Arlene Campbell, Kathryn Doyle and Portia Larlee.  All errors 
are my own.
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Introduction
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously constitutionalized 
access to medical assistance in dying (MAiD).1 It is not an unqualified 
right and the Court left it to Parliament to set out the circumstances under 
which a person can lawfully receive MAiD. The next year the federal 
government responded with legislation that decriminalized MAiD, set out 
the specific situations when it can be accessed and, as is consistent with 
the division of powers, left it to the provinces to implement regulations.2 
Despite judicial leadership and legislative response, MAiD remains 
fraught with difficulties both for the health care workers who must deliver 
care within a permissive regime, and for a broader Canadian public who 
has to adapt to a value-laden choice legally available for some of our most 
vulnerable citizens. There are innumerable legal, legislative, political and 
1. See Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 [Carter].
2. See Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts 
(medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016 (assented to 17 June 2016), SC 2016, c 3 [Bill 
C-14].
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social challenges surrounding MAiD, including legal challenges to the 
federal legislative criteria for accessing it,3 concerns over accurate record-
keeping for requests, denials in the performance of MAiD, difficulties 
facilitating access in remote locations, tensions within the palliative care 
community over how MAiD fits within that mandate, and the lingering 
stigma associated with the choice. All of these issues, and others, will 
need time and patience to sort out as we move to making MAiD accessible 
and acceptable. 
This essay focuses on one of the most significant challenges: 
conscientious and religious objections to the provision of MAiD. 
Across Canada, publicly-funded faith-influenced4 institutions refuse to 
provide MAiD. Some individual physicians profess strong religious and 
conscientious objections to it.5 The individual and institutional resistance 
combines to imperil access to MAiD and to stigmatize it as the “wrong” 
choice. For those who fit the criteria for accessing MAiD and who want 
3. Following a decision in the Quebec Superior Court in Truchon c Procureur général du Canada, 
2019 QCCS 3792 [Truchon], the Federal government introduced amendments to the Criminal Code, 
RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code] that expanded access to MAiD; See Bill C-7, An Act to amend 
the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 24 February 
2020) [Bill C-7]. The most significant amendment removes the requirement that death be “reasonably 
foreseeable.” Further review of excluded categories is promised beginning in June 2020.
4. I am grateful to a participant at the 2019 Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers 
conference in Vancouver, British Columbia for suggesting this descriptor. I had been using “faith-
based hospitals” but “faith-influenced” more accurately captures that the hospitals I am concerned 
about here are publicly-funded institutions that operate under the auspices of a religious umbrella 
steering group. They are therefore not directly run by a particular Church but rather are influenced in 
policy decisions by their directing faith-led organizations.
5. This paper focuses on religious and conscientious objection in particular. Scholars note that 
there are other reasons why a practitioner might not want to provide MAiD. Shaad and Shaad 
argue: “Some doctors might view MAID as contrary to the internal morality of medicine. Others 
are palliative care specialists concerned that MAID impedes access to palliative care services. Still 
others might understandably fear that it would have a corrupting influence on their own character.” 
See Philip Shaad & Joshua Shaad, “Institutional Non-participation in Assisted Dying: Changing 
the Conversation” (2019) 33:1 Bioethics 207 at 213. There has been considerable resistence among 
many members of the palliative care community to offering MAiD in hospices and palliative care 
institutions. In November 2019, the Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association and the Canadian 
Society of Palliative Care Specialists issued a joint statement arguing that MAiD is NOT part of 
the palliative care “basket” nor is it an extension of palliative care: “Hospice palliative care and 
MAiD substantially differ in multiple areas including in philosophy, intention and approach. Hospice 
palliative care focuses on improving quality of life and symptom management through holistic person-
centered care for those living with life threatening conditions. Hospice palliative care sees dying as a 
normal part of life and helps people to live and die well. Hospice palliative care does not seek to hasten 
death or intentionally end life. In MAiD, however, the intention is to address suffering by ending life 
through the administration of a lethal dose of drugs at an eligible person’s request.” See “CHPCA and 
CSPCP—Joint Call to Action” (2019), online (pdf): Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association & 
Canadian Society of Palliative Care Physicians <https://www.cspcp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
CHPCA-and-CSPCP-Statement-on-HPC-and-MAiD-Final.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2LY6-6EV2]. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to consider the palliative care community position, but it should be 
emphasized it goes beyond matters of conscience.
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to exercise that choice, any denial of access is a profoundly devastating 
roadblock in what is already a complicated path. While there may be 
a need to move with some caution, and a need to be sensitive to how 
fundamental a shift this might seem in healthcare provision, the Supreme 
Court has spoken clearly. Canadians who meet the legislated criteria have 
a constitutional entitlement not to have unjustified barriers put in the way 
of access to MAiD within a publicly-funded health care system. While 
we might fiddle with the criteria, expanding it and clarifying it with more 
experience,6 over 7000 Canadians have already received MAiD and it is 
becoming a more realistic end-of-life option with each passing month.
Part I of this paper offers a brief overview of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s constitutionalization of access to MAiD in Carter. Part II offers 
a short summary of the Court’s approach to freedom of religion as laid 
out in its section 2(a) jurisprudence, examining both the individual and 
institutional aspects of the freedom as they pertain to MAiD. Part III 
describes the contours of conscientious or religious objection to MAiD 
at the individual physician level and assesses the role it plays at the 
institutional level. Part III also applies the doctrinal tests developed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada for section 2(a) to individual and institutional 
objections to MAiD. Part IV considers the section 1 balancing exercise 
to reconcile the rights of conscientious and religious objectors with the 
rights of Canadians wanting access to MAiD. The paper concludes by 
recommending that all provincial regulatory bodies require at the least 
an “effective referral” model for individual conscientious or religious 
6. In December 2016, the Minister of Health Jane Philpott and Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General of Canada Jody Wilson-Raybould asked the Council of Canadian Academies to undertake 
independent reviews related to medical assistance in dying: “Specifically, the CCA is tasked with 
examining three particularly complex types of requests for medical assistance in dying that were 
identified for further review and study in the legislation passed by Parliament in 2016. These cases are: 
requests by mature minors, advance requests, and requests where mental illness is the sole underlying 
medical condition.” See “State of Knowledge on Medical Assitance in Dying for Mature Minors, 
Advance Requests, and Where a Mental Disorder is the Sole Underlying Medical Condition” (2018), 
online (pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca?> [https://perma.cc/43KM-
ES9Q]; “The State of Knowledge on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mature Minors” (2018), online 
(pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://perma.cc/48GC-MRYQ]; “The 
State of Knowledge on Advance Requests for Medical Assistance in Dying” (2018), online (pdf): 
Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://perma.cc/9EFF-GG32]; “The State of 
Knowledge on Medical Assistance in Dying Where a Mental Disorder is the Sole Underlying Medical 
Condition” (2018), online (pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://
perma.cc/LWV6-7ZJS]. In June, 2020 a legislated review of MAiD will begin to consider all of 
these issues. As of October, 2018, 6749 people had accessed legalized MAiD in Canada. See “Fourth 
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objectors. Ontario’s policy, outlined below, can serve as an example, 
as it requires objectors to refer to a colleague in a good faith, timely 
way, without impeding access to any services. The paper ends with the 
normative assertion that objections by publicly-funded institutions should 
not be permitted. While not all hospitals offer all medical services, 
to the extent an institution is competent to offer MAiD, and routinely 
experiences end-of-life situations with patients, it should not be allowed 
to refuse MAiD on religious or conscientious grounds. Access to MAiD 
should be unimpeded by politics, professional regulatory regimes, and 
religion. We should support the early and ongoing efforts to make MAiD 
accessible by addressing the proper limits of freedom of conscience and 
religion claims in providing the service. In so doing, we can hopefully 
protect the people providing and accessing MAiD, accommodate those 
health care practitioners who object to providing MAiD, and establish 
proper boundaries for health care institutions.
I. Rights in conflict: the constitutionalization of MAiD 
1. The Carter decision
Carter marked a dramatic moment for the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the country. The Court revisited its 1993 decision, Rodriguez v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), in which a closely divided 5-4 Court 
concluded that criminal prohibitions on physician assisted death did 
not violate a person’s section 7 right to life and security of the person.7 
Some twenty years later, the Court in Carter found that both societal and 
individual norms had shifted and that our understanding of what constitutes 
“principles of fundamental justice” (POFJ) had evolved. Presented with a 
comprehensive evidentiary record and the accumulated wisdom of other 
countries that allow MAiD, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s 
decision that blanket criminal prohibitions on MAiD violate the section 7 
rights of those with a grievous and irremediable medical condition.8 
7. [1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR (4th) 342 [Rodriguez]. Sue Rodriguez was the rights claimant in 
this case. She suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a rapidly deteriorating physical condition that 
impacted every physical aspect of her body. She argued that the criminal law prohibitions on assisted 
suicide violated her section 7 and 15 rights. A majority of the Court disagreed. Justice Sopinka concluded 
that section 7 was most concerned with the value of “life” in its protection of security of the person, and 
that valuing life was incompatible with permitting vulnerable people to receive aid in dying. Further, there 
was no international consensus on permitting assisted death. 
8. Specifically the Court concluded in Carter, supra note 1 at para 127: “The appropriate remedy 
is therefore a declaration that s 241(b) and s 14 of the Criminal Code are void insofar as they prohibit 
physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination 
of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or 
disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances 
of his or her condition. ‘Irremediable,’ it should be added, does not require the patient to undertake 
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In particular, the Court held that the criminal law restrictions caused 
some people to take their lives prematurely, while still physically capable of 
doing so themselves, rather than wait until they were physically incapable 
and assistance would be unlawful. This premature implementation of the 
decision to die by choice as a result of the state’s laws—federal Criminal 
Code prohibitions—constituted a state deprivation of life that was not in 
accordance with the POFJ. The provisions violated the POFJ by being 
overbroad.9 While the state may have a valid interest in protecting 
vulnerable individuals who could be coerced into assisted death, the 
blanket prohibition also captured autonomous individuals who were not 
vulnerable, but simply physically incapable of carrying out their death. It 
also captured those who had the mental and physical capacity to make the 
decision, but did not want to commit suicide in secret and by potentially 
gruesome means.10 Those who meet legislative criteria for access, the 
Court said, should be able to freely make this choice, facilitated by the 
state. The state’s deprivation of life through a blanket prohibition therefore 
violated section 7 of the Charter. 
The Court in Carter acknowledged that medical professionals—those 
who would be tasked with performing MAiD—would have to grapple with 
religious and conscientious beliefs and values around death and assisted 
death. Several intervenor religious organizations asked the Court to include 
strong protections for conscientious and religious objection in crafting a 
remedy.11 The Court carefully noted that a declaration of invalidity of the 
Criminal Code provisions does nothing to compel physician participation. 
It left the question of the extent of protections for conscientious and 
religious rights to physician regulatory bodies and the provinces. While 
recognizing there are religious and conscientious implications for some, it 
stayed decidedly out of the fray in settling how those concerns should be 
addressed. The Court only observed that the Charter rights of physicians 
and patients would have to be “reconciled.”12 
treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.”
9. Ibid at paras 56-58, 86-88. 
10. Ibid at para 86.
11. The Court summarized the intervenor submissions: “The Catholic Civil Rights League, the 
Faith and Freedom Alliance, the Protection of Conscience Project, and the Catholic Health Alliance 
of Canada all expressed concern that physicians who object to medical assistance in dying on moral 
grounds may be obligated, based on a duty to act in their patients’ best interests, to participate in 
physician-assisted dying. They ask us to confirm that physicians and other health-care workers cannot 
be compelled to provide medical aid in dying. They would have the Court direct the legislature to 
provide robust protection for those who decline to support or participate in physician-assisted dying 
for reasons of conscience or religion” (ibid at para 130).
12. Ibid at para 132.
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2. Bill C-14
The Federal Government responded to Carter with Bill C-14 “Medical 
Assistance in Dying.”13 The law received Royal Assent in June 2016 and 
set out the circumstances under which MAiD can be lawfully performed.14 
The eligibility criteria departed from the Supreme Court’s approach in 
some fundamental ways. The Supreme Court declared the Criminal Code 
prohibitions void in so far as they applied to:
“a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of 
life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including 
an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is 
intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition. 
‘Irremediable,’ it should be added, does not require the patient to 
undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.”15 
The federal legislation required death to be “reasonably foreseeable”16 
and also required that the person be in an “advanced state of irreversible 
decline in capability.”17 Furthermore, the person’s condition had to be both 
serious and incurable.18 
The government proposed the law after a period of consultation by 
a Special Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee that produced a 
report with twenty-one recommendations in February 2016.19 Among 
13. Bill C-14, supra note 2.
14. Bill C-14 supra note 2 at s 241.2 (1) “A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if 
they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they are eligible—or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting period, 
would be eligible—for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was 
not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been 
informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.”
15. Carter, supra note 1 at para 127.
16. But see recent proposed amendments to the Criminal Code that would remove this criterium, 
Bill C-7, supra note 3.
17. Bill C-14, supra note 2 at s 241.2 (2): “A person has a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; 
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; 
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical 
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under 
conditions that they consider acceptable; and 
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific 
length of time that they have remaining.”
18. Ibid.
19. House of Commons, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach: Report of the 
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the recommendations are two that pertain to conscientious and religious 
objectors. First, recommendation 10 suggests:
“That the Government of Canada work with the provinces and territories 
and their medical regulatory bodies to establish a process that respects a 
health care practitioner’s freedom of conscience while at the same time 
respecting the needs of a patient who seeks medical assistance in dying. 
At a minimum, the objecting practitioner must provide an effective 
referral for the patient.”20
The Committee quoted directly from Carter on the need to 
“reconcile” patient and physician rights and concluded “having health care 
professionals who conscientiously object to MAiD provide an effective 
referral for a patient who seeks MAiD is an appropriate balancing of the 
rights of patients and the conscience rights of physicians.”21 
Second, recommendation 11 suggests: “[t]hat the Government of 
Canada work with the provinces and territories to ensure that all publicly 
funded health care institutions provide medical assistance in dying.”22 
In laying out this recommendation the Committee noted: “[a] number 
of witnesses argued, and the Committee also believes, that if a health 
care facility is publicly funded, it must provide MAiD. The difficulty 
in transferring a patient from one facility to another was highlighted.”23 
Some Conservative members of the Joint Committee filed a dissenting 
report, disagreeing with many of the recommendations including the 
two on conscientious and religious objections.24 The dissenting report 
concluded an effective referral regime went too far. It preferred that the 
government establish an independent agency to coordinate referrals for 
MAiD. Objecting physicians would be obligated to give patients the 
contact information for the agency, which would then connect the patient 
to a provider.25 This model is used in Alberta and Quebec, for example.26 
The dissenting report also stressed that faith-influenced institutions must 
be exempt from the requirement to provide MAiD.27 They relied on the 
Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (February 2016) (Joint Chairs: Hon Kelvin 
Kenneth Ogilvie & Robert Oliphant).
20. Ibid at 26.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 27. 
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at 51 (dissenting opinion of Members of the Conservative Party of Canada on the Joint 
Committee).
25. Ibid at 55.
26. See Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, CQLR c S-32.0002, ss 31, 50 [Quebec EOL Care]; Alberta 
Health Services, “Medical Assistance in Dying: Policy HCS-165-01” (2018) at 8, online (pdf): <www.
albertahealthservices.ca> [https://perma.cc/SQ76-ZELD] [AHS Policy].
27. House of Commons, supra note 19 at 55.
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Supreme Court’s observation in Loyola that, “individual and collective 
aspects of freedom of religion and conscience guaranteed under the 
Charter are ‘indissolubly intertwined.’”28
The federal legislation crafted in part from these recommendations 
includes only this statement in its preamble: “[w]hereas everyone has 
freedom of conscience and religion under section 2 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms…”29 MAiD is therefore legally available 
in Canada for certain individuals who meet the criteria and want to 
exercise the choice. Provincial responsibility for the delivery of healthcare 
has produced a patchwork of options to accommodate religious and 
conscientious objectors. In Manitoba, for example, objecting physicians 
are permitted to refuse to refer a patient to a non-objecting colleague, but 
are required to provide patients with an informational resource.30 In Alberta 
and Quebec, a “self-referral” model prevails where patients can contact a 
centralized referral service if their own physician refuses.31 Ontario has 
the most robust system, requiring an “effective referral.”32 Across the 
country, faith-influenced institutions, loosely organized under umbrella 
organizations, collectively refuse to provide MAiD. Some jurisdictions 
have more faith-influenced institutions than others. In Newfoundland, for 
example, there are none.33 Much of Alberta, on the other hand, is serviced 
by faith-influenced institutions.34 All of this regional disparity means that 
ease of access to MAiD depends on where you live. This is eerily familiar 
for those who champion reproductive rights, as the Supreme Court decision 
in R v Morgentaler struck down Criminal Code prohibitions on abortion 
in part because of unequal access to the service across the country.35 In 
28. Ibid, citing Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 121 at para 94 [Loyola].
29. Bill C-14, supra note 2.
30. “Standards of Practice of Medicine” (2019) at 99, online (pdf): College of Physicians & 
Surgeons of Manitoba <http://cpsm.mb.ca/> [https://perma.cc/Q2QT-AW3Q] [CPSM Standard]; See 
also, “Policy: Medical Assistance in Dying” (2017) at 3.16, 4.1, online (pdf): Winnipeg Regional 
Health Authority <www.wrha.mb.ca/MAiD> [https://perma.cc/S2WY-Q7NF].
31. See Quebec EOL Care, supra note 26 at ss 31, 51; AHS Policy, supra note 26 at 8.
32. “Medical Assistance in Dying” (2018) at 5, online (pdf): College of Physicians & Surgeons of 
Ontario <www.cpso.on.ca> [https://perma.cc/V58D-6S39] [CPSO Policy].
33. “Room to Grow: About Our Health Care System” (2019), online: Practice Newfoundland and 
Labrador <www.practicenl.ca> [https://perma.cc/6XW5-GRKG].
34. See “Hospitals and Health Centres” (2019), online: Convenant Health <www.covenanthealth.
ca> [https://perma.cc/7HE7-48F8]. See also “Mission” (2019), online: Convenant Health <www.
covenanthealth.ca> [https://perma.cc/RH4W-KABK].
35. [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385. In concluding that the administrative structure for granting 
permission for abortion set out in the Criminal Code did not comport with the principles of fundamental 
justice, then Chief Justice Dickson argued: “Consider then the case of a pregnant married woman who 
wishes to apply for a therapeutic abortion certificate because she fears that her psychological health 
would be impaired seriously if she carried the foetus to term. The uncontroverted evidence reveals that 
there are many areas in Canada where such a woman would simply not have access to a therapeutic 
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Morgentaler, the Court concluded that a federal Criminal Code defence 
had to be uniformly available to all who could avail themselves of it, 
regardless of their location in Canada. The MAiD exceptions to the ban 
on assisting a suicide operate in a similar way as the abortion permission 
system worked. It is therefore legally problematic if access to MAiD 
differs dramatically across the country.
II. Section 2(a) and freedom of religion under the Charter
1. Individual freedom of religion
The Supreme Court decision in Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys outlines the Court’s approach to section 2(a) in the most 
common kind of challenge.36 The decision represented a classic freedom of 
religion dilemma. A school board had a rule prohibiting bringing weapons 
to school. This was a rule of “general applicability”—it applied to all 
students, faculty, and guests coming on to school grounds. Weapons were 
prohibited to all. The rights claimant was a young student and member 
of the Sikh faith who wanted permission to wear a ceremonial dagger 
(known as a kirpan) to school. He sincerely believed his faith required 
wearing a kirpan at all times. He wanted an exception to the general rule—
an accommodation for his religious beliefs. As a compromise, the claimant 
offered to ensure that the kirpan was sealed and sewn up in his clothing. 
He could still satisfy the tenets of his faith but the school board’s “no 
weapons” policy would be respected in its intent, as the kirpan would be 
inaccessible as a “weapon.” He argued that the state’s objective of public 
safety would still be achieved with this compromise. The school board 
disagreed.
Justice Charron wrote the majority decision. She began with an 
analytical argument about the interaction between sections 2(a) and 1 of 
the Charter. The Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence had yet to make 
clear whether section 2(a) protected an almost absolute right that could 
only be limited through an Oakes analysis at section 1. She acknowledged 
that this was not a settled question, and that the parties themselves could 
abortion. She may live in an area where no hospital has four doctors; no therapeutic abortion committee 
can be created. Equally, she may live in a place where the treatment functions of the nearby hospitals 
do not satisfy the definition of “accredited hospital” in s. 251(6). Or she may live in a province where 
the provincial government has imposed such stringent requirements on hospitals seeking to create 
therapeutic abortion committees that no hospital can qualify. Alternatively, our hypothetical woman 
may confront a therapeutic abortion committee in her local hospital which defines “health” in purely 
physical terms or which refuses to countenance abortions for married women. In each of these cases, 
it is the administrative structures and procedures established by s. 251 itself that would in practice 
prevent the woman from gaining the benefit of the defence held out to her in s. 251(4)” (ibid at 70). 
36. 2006 SCC 6 [Multani].
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not agree on the proper approach. The rights claimant (Multani) argued 
that an absolute ban on the wearing of a kirpan was a clear violation of 
section 2(a) that must be justified under section 1. The Attorney General 
of Quebec as intervenor conceded there was an infringement of religious 
liberty in prohibiting the carrying of a kirpan. The Attorney General of 
Quebec argued that freedom of religion can be limited within section 
2(a) itself: it is not an almost absolute right. The school board argued 
that freedom of religion was not infringed because the right guaranteed 
by section 2(a) “must be limited by imperatives of public order, safety, 
and health, as well as by the rights and freedoms of others.”37 Justice 
Charron acknowledged: “[t]his Court has clearly recognized that freedom 
of religion can be limited when a person’s freedom to act in accordance 
with his or her beliefs may cause harm to or interfere with the rights of 
others”38 She also pointed out that the Court in other Charter contexts has 
stressed the advantages of reconciling competing rights under section 1. To 
illustrate this preference, she quoted from B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto, “it appears sounder to leave to the state the burden 
of justifying the restrictions it has chosen. Any ambiguity or hesitation 
should be resolved in favour of individual rights.”39 She noted that Multani 
did not involve the reconciliation of two constitutional rights and therefore 
a balancing under section 1 was more appropriate to the context. 
It is significant that Justice Charron’s preference for balancing under 
section 1 was much dependent on the specific situation Multani captured, 
that is the balancing of an individual right against a state policy that the 
state should bear the burden of justifying. There was no other rights holder 
with a strong interest in the outcome of this case. While other students 
and staff at the school have an interest in a safe environment, this can 
be characterized as a generalized or diffuse interest without a specific 
constitutional framework to bring it to the fore. This represents a different 
scenario than a contest between two identifiable and obvious competing 
rights holders, as evidenced in the context of MAiD. Whether it would 
require a different methodology for resolving claims or not, a MAiD case 
would present a challenge to the classic case law.
In finding a violation of section 2(a) in Multani, Justice Charron 
summarized the test as follows: the claimant must demonstrate (1) that 
he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with 
religion, and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party interferes, in 
37. Ibid at para 25.
38. Ibid at para 26.
39. Ibid, citing [1995] 1 SCR 315 at paras 109-110, 122 DLR (4th) 1, Justice La Forest.
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a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his or her ability to 
act in accordance with that practice or belief.40 This remains the governing 
approach to section 2(a) in the classic freedom of religion contest. In 
another significant decision on section 2(a), Alberta v Hutterian Brethren 
of Wilson Colony, then Chief Justice McLachlin, who wrote the majority 
reasons, began her judgment with a brief outline of what is meant by the 
phrase “more than trivial or insubstantial” in step one of the Multani test.41 
At issue was a provincial law requiring photos on all driver’s licences. The 
Hutterite claimants argued it violated their freedom of religion to require 
photos, as their belief system prohibits the capturing of an individual’s 
image. Chief Justice McLachlin elaborated that in order for a violation of 
section 2(a) to be made out, “it would need to be shown that the claimants’ 
‘religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened’ 
by the universal photo requirement….Evidence of a state-imposed cost 
or burden would not suffice; there would need to be evidence that such 
a burden was ‘capable of interfering with religious belief or practice.’”42 
This line of argument might become relevant in addressing the extent 
of any burden imposed by legislative requirements around MAiD. For 
example, the compromise of requiring an objecting physician to offer an 
effective referral to a non-objecting colleague might well be described as 
a “trivial” or insubstantial infringement of religious freedom; it might be 
a state-imposed cost or burden, but not one that interferes with religious 
belief or practice.43 MAiD cases could offer the Court an opportunity to 
consider the boundaries of section 2(a) protection itself, before the state 
becomes involved in justifying limits under section 1. 
2. Institutional freedom of religion: faith-influenced institutions and 
MAiD
In Loyola, the Court addressed the communal aspect of religious beliefs. 
It held that religious communities are protected by section 2(a), but the 
majority left open the question of whether a religious corporate entity 
could claim protection.44 At issue in the case was a challenge from a private 
40. Multani, supra note 36 at para 34.
41. 2009 SCC 37 at para 32 [Hutterian Brethren]. For a discussion on the need to clarify the non-
trivial/not insubstantial language in step one of the Multani test, see Howard Kislowicz, “Loyola 
High School v Attorney General of Quebec: On Non-Triviality and the Charter Value of Religious 
Freedom” (2015) 71:13 SCLR 331.
42. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 41 at para 34 [emphasis added]. 
43. See discussion at note 71. 
44. For a cogent analysis of the difference between the community and corporate aspect of 
communal protection, see JK Donlevy, Kevin P Feehan & Peter Bowal, “A Community’s Right to 
Freedom of Religion: Loyola High School v Quebec” in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and 
Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015).
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Catholic boys’ school to a Quebec provincial curriculum requirement that 
mandates the teaching of world religions from a neutral and objective 
perspective. Pursuant to section 22 of the legislation, the Minister of 
Education can grant an exemption from the program requirements if the 
proposed alternative program is deemed to be “equivalent.”45 A majority 
of the seven-member bench held that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
institutions are protected by section 2(a) of the Charter as Loyola was 
entitled to administrative review of the Minister’s decision not to grant 
an exemption in this case. The Minister is Charter-bound to exercise her 
discretion in a manner that “respects the values underlying the grant of 
her decision-making authority, including the Charter-protected religious 
freedom of the members of the Loyola community who seek to offer and 
wish to receive a Catholic education.”46 In urging the Minister to embrace 
Charter values, Justice Abella writing for the four-judge plurality noted: 
“[r]eligious freedom must therefore be understood in the context of a 
secular, multicultural and democratic society with a strong interest in 
protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and ensuring the 
vitality of a common belief in human rights.”47 Religious freedom is 
therefore not absolute and unqualified from a Charter perspective. It is 
influenced and perhaps even defined by its interplay with other Charter 
values. In this case, the Court held that the Minister did not give adequate 
consideration to freedom of religion. The matter was remitted back for her 
reconsideration.
Then Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Moldaver, on behalf of 
the remaining three judges, held in obiter that section 2(a) could extend 
to protecting institutional freedom of religion claims. They argued this 
was a necessary corollary to the individual and collective nature of 
religious expression. Many individuals express their sincerely held 
beliefs through their religious institutions: “[t]he individual and collective 
aspects of freedom of religion are indissolubly intertwined. The freedom 
of religion of individuals cannot flourish without freedom of religion for 
the organizations through which those individuals express their religious 
practices and through which they transmit their faith.”48 Obviously, context 
is key, and religious institutions are not entitled to the protection in all 
situations and for all purposes. This group of three judges fashioned a test 
for determining when section 2(a) can extend to an institutional claim: 
45. Loyola, supra note 28 at para 1.
46. Ibid at para 34.
47. Ibid at para 47.
48. Ibid at para 94.
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“On the submissions before us, and given the collective aspect of 
religious freedom long established in our jurisprudence, we conclude 
that an organization meets the requirements for s. 2(a) protection if (1) 
it is constituted primarily for religious purposes, and (2) its operation 
accords with these religious purposes.”49 
The judges left open the scope of this protection as meriting clarification 
in future cases. It was clear to them that regardless of the parameters, 
Loyola would fit the test: “[i]t is a non-profit religious corporation 
constituted for the purpose of offering a Jesuit education to children within 
Quebec’s Catholic religious community. It has operated for over a century 
in accordance with this religious educational purpose.”50 
Notably, in applying the test it fashioned for institutional protection, 
the minority deviated somewhat from the strictness of its own language. In 
application, it treated the two requirements (constitution and operation) as 
an “or” proposition, not an “and.” While the test requires an organization be 
“constituted primarily for religious purposes,” in considering the facts of 
this case, the minority only asked: “[i]s Loyola’s claimed belief that it must 
teach ethics and its own religion from the Catholic perspective consistent 
with its organizational purpose and operation?”51 In concluding it was, 
the minority stated that “Loyola’s belief in its religious obligation to teach 
Catholicism and ethics from a Catholic perspective is consistent with its 
organizational purpose and operation.”52 This emphasis on “consistency” 
with purpose is not the same as requiring an organization to be “constituted 
primarily for the purpose” in order to qualify for protection under section 
2(a). If consistency with purpose is all that is required, it may be easier for 
an institution to argue its refusal to allow MAiD is legitimate. One could 
argue that a faith-influenced institution operates consistently if it defines 
its purpose as offering faith-influenced care. In other words, the way the 
minority applied its own test seems to allow more space for institutions 
to self-describe or self-define. The way the test is worded in the abstract 
suggests a more neutral or objective approach to assessing an institution’s 
purpose. For faith-influenced institutions, it is easier to satisfy a test for 
section 2(a) protection that does not require the institution to show it was 
constituted primarily for the purpose of providing faith-influenced care. It 
is also easier for the institution to self-define as operating within a faith 
tradition, as opposed to satisfying an objective assessment. 
49. Ibid at para 100 [emphasis added].
50. Ibid at 101.
51. Ibid at 140 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid at 143 [emphasis added].
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Loyola therefore offers the Court’s first pass at the institutional 
question. Neither set of reasons suggests that a religious institution is 
entitled to section 2(a) protection in all contexts. The minority opens the 
door under restricted circumstances, though the contours of the boundaries 
of protection are uncertain. The majority leaves the question open, but 
suggests that religious freedom must be assessed in the context of other 
Charter values. If the majority view prevails, provinces would have an 
obligation to consider Charter values in any limits imposed or negotiated 
with institutions in the delivery of health services. In considering its 
role, governments would be guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City) on the state’s duty of 
religious neutrality.53
3. State neutrality on religious matters
The conflict in Saguenay arose after the Mayor of the city refused to 
stop opening council meetings with a public prayer and remove religious 
symbolism that adorned the chambers. A citizen who regularly attended 
meetings complained of a violation of his rights under sections 3 and 10 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Section 3 provides: 
“[e]very person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom 
of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.”54 
Section 10 states: “[e]very person has a right to full and equal recognition 
and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, 
exclusion or preference based on…religion. Discrimination exists where 
such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing such right.”55 The Court described section 2(a) of the Canadian 
Charter as a companion to these rights and concluded that because of 
their similarity, the analyses should inform each other.56 While there is no 
express duty for the state to remain neutral on matters of religion, such an 
obligation has evolved in both jurisprudence and scholarly analysis.57 The 
Court concluded: 
“When all is said and done, the state’s duty to protect every person’s 
freedom of conscience and religion means that it may not use its powers 
53. 2015 SCC 16 [Saguenay].
54. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c C-12, s 3. 
55. Ibid at s 10.
56. Saguenay, supra note 53 at para 67.
57. Ibid at paras 71, 73, citing Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v 
Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48 at paras 66-67, Justice LeBel; Richard Moon, “Freedom of 
Religion Under the Charter of Rights: the Limit of State Neutrality” (2012) 45:2 UBC L Rev 497 at 
507.
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in such a way as to promote the participation of certain believers or non-
believers in public life to the detriment of others. It is prohibited from 
adhering to one religion to the exclusion of all others.”58 
Of particular significance for our purposes is the way the Court framed 
its approach to claims that the state has violated its duty to remain neutral. 
It held: “[i]n a case like this one in which a complaint of discrimination 
based on religion concerns a state practice, the alleged breach of the duty 
of neutrality must be established by proving that the state is professing, 
adopting or favouring one belief to the exclusion of all others…and that 
the exclusion has resulted in interference with the complainant’s freedom 
of conscience and religion.”59 The Supreme Court has already determined 
that hospitals are “government actors” and therefore subject to the Charter 
when delivering provincially-regulated medical services. In Eldridge v 
British Columbia (Attorney General), Justice LaForest held: 
“while hospitals may be autonomous in their day-to-day operations, 
they act as agents for the government in providing the specific medical 
services set out in the Act. The Legislature, upon defining its objective 
as guaranteeing access to a range of medical services, cannot evade 
its obligations under…the Charter to provide those services without 
discrimination by appointing hospitals to carry out that objective. In so 
far as they do so, hospitals must conform with the Charter.”60
If hospitals are state agents as described in Eldridge, then an 
institutional decision not to provide MAiD can be characterized as a 
“government” decision. When that decision is made because of religious 
or conscientious reasons, and when the institution is claiming Charter 
protections for freedom of religion, this is a government position. Saguenay 
suggests this should not be permitted. A province that supports a faith-
influenced institution that refuses to provide MAiD is arguably “adopting” 
or “favouring” the faith of the institution’s founders or Board of Directors 
to the exclusion of others. This constitutes a violation of the conscientious 
or religious rights of taxpayers who do not share the institution’s faith, 
58. Saguenay, supra note 53 at para 76.
59. Ibid at para 83.
60. [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 51, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge]. Eldridge was distinguished from the 
context of Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483, 76 DLR (4th) 700 [Stoffman] 
where the Court held that a hospital’s governing Board of Directors was not subject to the Charter 
as a government entity when making decisions that do not implicate government policy. Stoffman 
concerned a challenge to mandatory retirement rules in the Board’s granting of hospital privileges. 
See Martha Jackman, “The Application of the Canadian Charter in the Health Law Context” (2001) 
9:2 Health L Rev 22 at 24 for an analysis of why Eldridge means that the Charter applies to hospitals, 
physicians and other health care providers who act as agents for the state in delivering publicly-funded 
health care.
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and cannot access a legal medical service in that institution. This is an 
interpretation of Saguenay that offers the broadest protection for a secular 
health care policy decision model. It is not however, the only way to look 
at the neutrality dilemma.
Richard Moon distinguishes between religious values, which may be 
supported by the state, and religious practices that demand neutrality.61 
He argues that the state must remain neutral towards only religious belief 
systems that address spiritual or worldly matters and that are confined to the 
sphere of private life (like for example the proper forms of worship).62 On 
the other hand, where religious values are implicated in “worldly concerns 
or civic issues,” these must be debated on their merits, “on their conception 
of human good or public welfare.”63 Saguenay and state neutrality under 
this divided view represents a more challenging way to approach the 
limits of faith in institutional health care. A faith-influenced institution 
could argue that MAiD is a “public welfare issue” around which there is 
legitimate and evident debate. The decision to decriminalize MAiD and 
its highly regulated delivery, reinforce that it is at least in part a political 
matter. A faith-influenced institution might be able to successfully argue 
in court that it represents not only the practices of religious communities 
that do not support MAiD, but also acts as a space where the debate over 
spiritual values can accommodate different viewpoints. 
Ultimately, the concern over state neutrality leans towards the view 
that institutions that receive significant public funding not be governed 
by religious practices. As Moon argues, “[a] religious belief should not 
play a role in political decision-making if the action it calls for is spiritual 
in character (relating simply to spiritual concerns, or involving the 
worshipping or honouring of God).”64 An institutional refusal to allow 
MAiD because the particular faith does not believe in it, sounds more like 
“worship” than politically legitimate debate over values and ethics. 
III. Application of jurisprudence to MAiD
1. Freedom of religion and the practice of medicine 
There has already been an unsuccessful court challenge to an effective 
referral requirement that considers the Charter rights of physicians and 
engages the issue of reconciling competing rights.65 Five individual 
61. Moon, supra note 57.
62. Ibid at 524.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid at 520.
65. See Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario, 2019 ONCA 393 [CMDSC v CPSO].
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physicians and several physician advocacy organizations challenged 
two policies of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (the 
College) that require physicians with conscientious or religious objections 
to providing care make an effective referral to a non-objecting colleague. 
In Ontario, the College has opted for an “effective referral” regime to 
accommodate individual conscientious or religious objections to providing 
a service.66 Policy 2-15 states: 
Where physicians are unwilling to provide certain elements of care for 
reasons of conscience or religion, an effective referral to another health-
care provider must be provided to the patient. An effective referral 
means a referral made in good faith, to a non-objecting, available, and 
accessible physician or other health-care professional, or agency. The 
referral must be made in a timely manner to allow patients to access 
care. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical outcomes due to a 
delayed referral. Physicians must not impede access to care for existing 
patients, or those seeking to become patients.67 
Policy 2-15 covers broad human rights and non-discrimination 
obligations, and was incorporated with identical wording into specific 
guidance on MAiD in Policy 4-16. The College sees an effective referral 
regime as the appropriate compromise between patient entitlement to legal 
medical services and the protection and support of physicians who have 
religious or conscience objections to the service:
In order to uphold patient autonomy and facilitate the decision-making 
process, physicians must provide the patient with information about all 
options for care that may be available or appropriate to meet the patient’s 
clinical needs, concerns, and/or wishes. Physicians must not withhold 
information about the existence of any procedure or treatment because it 
conflicts with their conscience or religious beliefs.
Where a physician declines to provide medical assistance in dying for 
reasons of conscience or religion, the physician must not abandon the 
patient. An effective referral must be provided. An effective referral 
means a referral made in good faith, to a non-objecting, available, and 
accessible physician, nurse practitioner or agency. The referral must be 
made in a timely manner to allow the patient to access medical assistance 
in dying. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical outcomes due 
to delayed referrals.68
66. For an analysis of the College’s policy in the context of reproductive services, see Daphne 
Gilbert, “Let Thy Conscience Be Thy Guide (but not My Guide): Physicians and the Duty to Refer” 
(2017) 10:2 McGill JL & Health 47.
67. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 18, citing the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario, “Policy 2-15: Professional Obligations and Human Rights” (2015).
68. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 23, citing the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario, “Policy 4-16: Medical Assistance in Dying” (2015) [emphasis added].
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What is the freedom of religion argument for physicians to an effective 
referral regime? The main way that objections to referral are described 
is as a “complicity” offence.69 Those who have strong conscientious and 
religious objections to performing a service (MAiD, abortion, providing 
contraception, etc) argue that referring a patient to another non-objecting 
physician still implicates the objector in that service. Objectors believe 
there is something “wrong” or “sinful” in the service and therefore refuse to 
be complicit in its delivery. The College expressly rejects a broad definition 
of “providing a service” and by implication dismisses the legitimacy of 
complicity-based objections to effective referral requirements. The MAiD 
policy includes this final caveat: “the College does not consider providing 
the patient with an ‘effective referral’ as ‘assisting’ in providing medical 
assistance in dying.”70 
The applicants argued the policy violated both sections 2(a) and 15 of 
the Charter. They lost at first instance on the basis that while the policy 
is a violation of freedom of religion, it is justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. The Divisional Court did not consider freedom of conscience 
and dismissed entirely the section 15 claim.71 The Ontario Court of Appeal 
agreed with the “thorough and cogent analysis” of the Court below and 
dismissed the appeal.72
69. See Amy J Sepinwall, “Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions 
in Hobby Lobby’s Wake” (2015) 82:4 U Chicago L Rev 1897. See also Douglas NeJaime & Reva 
Siegel, “Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and 
Pluralism” in Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld, eds, The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the 
Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality (United States: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
187 at 219. The authors conclude: “In seeking exemptions from laws that religious claimants assert 
make them complicit in sins of their fellow citizens, religious claimants may speak as a minority and 
yet assert what have long been the norms of the majority against those whose rights the law has only 
recently and fragilely come to protect. Under these circumstances, limiting accommodation in ways 
that respect the convictions of the believer and one’s fellow citizens is the most pluralism-promoting 
path.” NeJaime and Siegel were writing in the context of complicity wars in what they term the 
“culture wars” over LGBTQ and abortion rights. Given how recently Canada legalized MAiD, it could 
well be argued to be a fragile “right.” 
70. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 23, citing CPSO Policy, supra note 32 [emphasis added].
71. The Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario, 2018 ONSC 579. After noting (at para 117) that the parties devoted little attention to their 
section 15(1) claim during the hearing, the Divisional Court held there was no equality violation for 
three reasons. First (at para 129), the effective referral policy is an attempt to take the specific concerns 
of the objectors into account; second (at para 130), the policy has an ameliorative effect for vulnerable 
groups seeking medical services; and third, the Court concluded (at para 131), “The burdens imposed 
on objecting physicians, for whom the options for compliance with the effective referral requirements 
of the Policies are not satisfactory, pertain ultimately to the nature of their practice of medicine.  It is 
important in this context to note that there is no constitutionally protected right to practice medicine 
as discussed further below.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court’s reasoning noting 
that while the appellants renewed their section 15(1) objections in their facta, it was not raised in oral 
argument (CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 90). 
72. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 8.
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In determining that an effective referral policy violates section 2(a), 
the Court disagreed with the College’s position that any interference with 
freedom of religion is trivial or insubstantial. Justice Strathy, for the Court, 
noted: 
While it is true that s.2(a) is internally limited, that not all religious 
conduct is protected by the Charter, and that context is important in 
considering whether interference with religious freedom is “trivial or 
insubstantial”, the specific contextual features identified by the College 
are more relevant to the proportionality analysis under s.1.73
The Court agreed that some of the individual appellants are not free to 
practice medicine in accordance with their religious beliefs because of the 
effective referral requirement, and that the specific context of their self-
regulated profession is better addressed under minimal impairment and in 
the final balancing under section 1.74 This reasoning suggests that courts 
are wary of engaging in a robust analysis under section 2(a) as to the scope 
and limits of freedom of religion, preferring to consider only whether 
the belief is sincere before moving on to section 1. Given the evidential 
burden that would be placed on challengers to refute an allegation that a 
breach of rights was only “trivial or insubstantial,” shifting the analysis 
to section 1 makes sense in cases where it is clear there is at least some 
evident encumbrance on religious freedom.
Justice Strathy next considered section 1 arguments, concluding that 
the pressing and substantial objective of the policy is, as argued by the 
College and found by the Divisional Court, “the facilitation of equitable 
[patient] access to [health care] services.”75 In the reasons that follow, the 
Court relied to a substantial degree on the submissions of the intervenors, 
and in particular LEAF, Dying with Dignity Canada and the Canadian 
HIV/AIDS Legal Network. The work of the intervenors was evident 
in the Court’s focus on the equality interests of particularly vulnerable 
patients who may be even more reliant than others on an effective referral 
model.76 A policy of effective referral is rationally connected to facilitating 
equitable access to services as a matter of “logic and common sense.”77
With respect to minimal impairment, the Court contextualized the 
claim in two significant ways. First, it located the role of the appellant 
73. Ibid at para 77.
74. Ibid. The Court concluded that the evidentiary record was insufficient to support an analysis of 
freedom of conscience and that it was inappropriate to explore the contours of that clause in a case 
with robust evidence (ibid at para 85).
75. Ibid at para 101.
76. Ibid at para 107.
77. Ibid at para 113.
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physicians as “gatekeepers” and a “key point of access” to the services in 
question for a majority of patients.78 Given how difficult it can be to find 
a family physician in Canada, and since for most patients, their family 
doctor is key to navigating a complex system of specialists and follow-
up treatment, effective referral policies protect patients who depend on 
their family doctor for coordination of care and initial counselling and 
information provision. The second important context was the nature of 
the services to which the appellants objected. In addition to MAiD, the 
appellants objected to providing effective referrals for other services 
including, “abortion, contraception (including emergency contraception, 
tubal ligation, and vasectomies), infertility treatment for heterosexual 
and homosexual patients, prescription of erectile dysfunction medication, 
[and] gender re-assignment surgery”79 The Court accepted that these 
issues are difficult for patients to raise and discuss, and noted that it “is 
impossible to conceive of more private, emotional or challenging issues for 
any patient.”80 Abortion and MAiD in particular, “carry the stigmatizing 
legacy of several centuries of criminalization grounded in religious and 
secular morality.”81 The combination of stigma and the vulnerability of 
patients in need of the services82 heightens the importance of the family 
physician’s gatekeeper role. Given that context, the effective referral 
policy was minimally impairing.
The appellants advocated for a “self-referral model” as less-impairing 
than an effective referral policy.83 They argued that having a centralized 
government agency with lists of MAiD providers would allow patients 
to make direct contact for a referral, without the objecting physician 
acting as a go-between. The only obligation on a physician would be to 
provide the phone number or website for the agency. The Court of Appeal 
agreed with the court below that a self-referral model entails a real risk 
that vulnerable patients will have delayed or no access to the requested 
78. Ibid at paras 118, 124.
79. Ibid at para 121.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid at para 123.
82. While all patients are vulnerable in the balance of power with their physician, the Court 
emphasizes the particular vulnerability of certain groups including, “patients with financial, social, 
educational or emotional challenges; patients who are old, young, poor or addicted to drugs; patients 
with mental health challenges or physical or intellectual disabilities; patients facing economic, 
linguistic, cultural or geographic barriers; and patients who do not have the skills, abilities or resources 
to navigate their own way through a vast and complicated health care system” (ibid at para 121). 
Clearly this represents a large fraction of many family medicine practices.
83. Ibid at paras 126-127. Self-referral might include a public information line with information or 
a coordination service or registry.
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medical services.84 It pointed out that the fundamental weakness in the 
appellant’s proposed alternatives to effective referral was the same as 
identified by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hutterian 
Brethren, that is “the alternatives proposed by the appellants and some 
of the intervenors are directed to minimizing the burden of the Policies 
on objecting physicians, not to advancing the goal of equitable access to 
abortion, MAiD, contraception and sexual and reproductive health care.”85 
In analysing the salutary and deleterious effects of the policy, the Court 
found “much assistance” in the arguments of Dying with Dignity Canada, 
which emphasized that “patients should not bear the burden of managing 
the consequences of physicians’ religious objections.”86 Interestingly, 
the Court noted that this compromise of effective referral is not optimal 
for patients, who lose the support and personalized care of their primary 
physician at a time of great vulnerability and stress.87 No party to the case 
argued that objectors should not be accommodated in any way, so it is of 
note that the Court acknowledged that even an effective referral model 
constitutes a harm to some patients.88 
The CPSO decision represents a victory for patient interests. The 
unanimous decision, written by Justice Strathy, is well-reasoned and 
follows an equally strong Divisional Court judgment. It should bolster 
similar policies in provinces that use the language of “effective transfer of 
care”89 and it serves as a compelling basis for challenging policies like that 
of Manitoba which expressly permit physicians not to refer patients.90 It 
is helpful that the Court concentrated its analysis on equality of access to 
the services in question, and its reference to stigma and vulnerability are 
84. Ibid at para 128.
85. Ibid at para 157.
86. Ibid at para 185.
87. Ibid at para 187.
88. In the United Kingdom, the decision on whether to accommodate religious or conscience beliefs 
is guided by the “Liberal Model of Conscientious Exemptions.” This model has three defining criteria
A. The liberal state should generally refrain from passing moral judgement on the content of the 
beliefs which give rise to a claim for conscientious exemption;
B. The liberal state should neither privilege nor disadvantage religious beliefs over non-
religious ones when considering whether to grant a conscientious exemption; and 
C. The liberal state should grant conscientious exemptions to claimants who sincerely hold 
a religious or non-religious conscientious objection which would not disproportionately 
impact on the rights of others or the public interest.
Point “C” and the reference to “disproportionate impact” is evocative of our section 1 analysis and 
reinforces that a patient’s interest in access to MAiD must be taken into account in balancing religious 
or conscience rights. See John Adenitire, “Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State” in John 
Adenitire, ed, Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State (Hart Publishing: 
Oxford, 2019) 247. 
89. See e.g. CPSO Policy, supra note 32 at 5. 
90. CPSM Standard, supra note 30.
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helpful to the symbolic arguments in favour of effective referral. While 
Strathy JA focused on the practical consequences of delayed or no access, 
his argument is equally applicable to the less tangible consequences of 
broad religious or conscientious objector protections. Physicians occupy 
a privileged space in a relationship with patients, with considerably more 
power and specialized knowledge. For many patients, a physician’s 
objection to providing legally-available services will be experienced as 
judgment for requesting that service. To allow a physician to opt out of 
caring for a vulnerable patient may mean that the patient does not feel 
justified in wanting the particular service, may be ashamed of having made 
the request in the first place, and may have heightened shame at having to 
ask again. The symbolic statement of moral and/or ethical disapproval is 
made explicit and stands as a strong disincentive for pursuing a course of 
treatment.
The CPSO decision may also be helpful in the broader context of 
refusals to provide care by faith-influenced institutions.91 While the case 
centered on individual physicians and the accommodations accorded to 
them, much of the language and reasoning is equally applicable in an 
institutional context. It is also true that an effective referral model for 
individual physicians is meaningless for hospitalized patients in faith-
influenced institutions that refuse to allow MAiD to be performed by any 
physician on the premises.
2. Faith-influenced institutions and refusal to treat
If the case were litigated, publicly-funded Catholic or other faith-influenced 
institutions would be unlikely to meet the minority decision which set out 
the Loyola test for institutional section 2(a) protection.92 Their mandate as 
health care providers would likely not satisfy either step. A hospital is not 
constituted “primarily for religious purposes.” The mission statements of 
Catholic hospitals do not suggest otherwise. For example, St. Michael’s 
Hospital in Toronto describes itself this way: 
91. Since the decision in CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65, members of Ontario’s Progressive 
Conservative party have voiced their support for legislating measures to protect the conscience rights 
of Ontario’s healthcare providers, though the government has yet to provide details on the content 
or timeline of such measures. See Victoria Gibson, “Ontario PC Members Rubber Stamp Call for 
Conscience Rights Legislation as New Federal MAID Bill Rolls Out,” iPolitics (26 February 2020), 
online: <ipolitics.ca> [https://perma.cc/YRK8-2KEU].
92. As set out in text accompanying supra note 28. That test requires that to claim institutional 2(a) 
protection an organization must show that (1) it is constituted primarily for religious purposes, and (2) 
its operation accords with these religious purposes. This assumes the entire Court adopted the views 
of the Loyola minority. Of course, it could fashion a different test.
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St. Michael’s Hospital is a Catholic teaching and research hospital 
founded by the Sisters of St. Joseph in 1892 to care for the sick and 
poor of Toronto’s inner city….As downtown Toronto’s adult trauma 
centre, the hospital is a hub for neurosurgery, complex cardiac and 
cardiovascular care, diabetes and osteoporosis care, minimally invasive 
surgery and care of the homeless and disadvantaged. St. Michael’s is also 
one of the province’s major sites of care for critically ill patients.93 
Other than identifying itself as a Catholic institution, its mission 
statement contains only this reference to any spiritual mission: 
“[p]roviding exemplary physical, emotional and spiritual care for each of 
our patients and their families.”94 Similarly, the Bruyère Centre in Ottawa 
has this Mission Statement: 
We excel in the provision of evidence based health care and services 
for the vulnerable and medically complex, with a focus on persons who 
require sub-acute, geriatric or palliative care. Inspired by our founder, 
Mother Élisabeth Bruyère, we are a Catholic health care organization 
that optimizes the quality of life of people within the diverse community 
we serve in French and English. We do this through our commitment 
to excellence, education, research and innovation, regional partnerships, 
and bringing care closer to home.95 
93. “Who we Are” (2019), online: St. Michael’s Hospital <www.stmichaelshospital.com> [https://
perma.cc/K76U-WRB7].
94. “Strategic Plan 2015-18” (2015) at 7, online (pdf): St. Michael’s Hospital Academic Family 
Health Team and Department of Family and Community Medicine <www.stmichaelshospital.com> 
[https://perma.cc/4H8K-RYA6].The full mission statement is: 
“St. Michael’s Hospital is a Catholic academic health care provider, fully affiliated with 
the University of Toronto and committed to innovative patient care, teaching and research. 
Established in 1892 by the Sisters of St. Joseph to care for the sick and poor, St. Michael’s 
Hospital remains dedicated to treating all with respect, compassion and dignity.
At St. Michael’s Hospital, we recognize the value of every person and are guided by our 
commitment to excellence and leadership. We demonstrate this by:
• Providing exemplary physical, emotional and spiritual care for each of our patients and their 
families
• Balancing the continued commitment to the care of the poor and those most in need with the 
provision of highly specialized services to a broader community.
• Building a work environment where each person is valued, respected and has an opportunity 
for personal and professional growth
• Advancing excellence in health services education
• Fostering a culture of discovery in all of our activities and supporting exemplary health 
sciences research
• Strengthening our relationships with universities, colleges, other hospitals, agencies and our 
community
• Demonstrating social responsibility through the just use of our resources
The commitment of our staff, physicians, volunteers, students, community partners and 
friends to our mission permits us to maintain a quality of presence and tradition of caring— 
the hallmarks of St. Michael’s” (ibid).
95. “Mission, Vision and Values” (2019), online: Bruyère <www.bruyere.org> [https://perma.cc/
QM3C-3TRZ].
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These two institutions are reflective of Catholic hospitals across the 
country. While situated in a historic attachment to Catholic founders, and 
linked as a network of “Catholic health care providers” under various 
umbrella organizations,96 Catholic hospitals provide care within a national 
health care strategy governed by the Canada Health Act.97 In Loyola, the 
four-person plurality judgment did not decide whether institutions could 
claim section 2(a) protection but, as quoted above, Justice Abella more 
broadly understood religious freedom as contextual and as co-existing 
with equality rights and human rights, in a secular society.98 The reasons 
why the minority found it an obvious case for Loyola was that its primary 
mission was to live out the reasons for its foundation: to offer private 
Catholic education to boys. The curriculum was designed to pass on the 
teaching of Catholicism (hence its successful Charter challenge to the 
Minister’s decision on enforcing a “neutral” provincial curriculum). Faith-
influenced institutions no doubt share a common historic commitment to 
serving impoverished and vulnerable communities, but the Loyola court’s 
reasoning that religious communities sometimes require institutions 
or collectives to bring faith alive does not fit with the broad, inclusive, 
scientific and public nature of government-regulated health care. Catholic 
hospitals are not organized to give Catholics a community or collective 
opportunity to live out their spiritual needs, and they do not primarily 
fulfill that purpose as medical institutions. Esau describes the reason why 
Loyola is deserving of community religious protection as stemming from 
this view of the educational impact of private religious schools:
 “Education at religious schools is not about taking a number of defined 
courses and getting a degree, but is rather about a transformative journey, 
where the extra-curriculum is as important at the curriculum, and where 
the experience is relational. The student is not alone on a path, but rather 
is part of a community travelling the path together.”99 
These considerations are not as strong (or arguably present at all) in 
faith-influenced institutions. While such an institution might argue that for 
terminally-ill patients, the journey to death in hospital is transformative, 
the lack of spiritual uniformity in staff, the fact that many patients do not 
choose what hospital they end up in, and the fact that patient choice might 
96. See e.g. “About CHSO,” online: Catholic Health Sponsors of Ontario <http://chco.ca> [https://
perma.cc/E9ZQ-DZC4]; “About Us” (2009), online: Catholic Health Alliance of Canada <www.chac.
ca> [https://perma.cc/8UWR-9HXB]. 
97. RSC 1985, c C-6.
98. Loyola, supra note 28 at para 47.
99. Alvin Esau, “Collective Freedom of Religion” in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and 
Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015) 77 at 85. 
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be more influenced by where their physician has privileges, all suggest 
that hospitals operate quite differently from schools.
Further, it is likely a court would find that hospitals do not operate 
sufficiently in accordance with religious purposes, as required by the 
second step of the minority’s Loyola test. It is incontrovertible that faith-
influenced institutions continue a legacy of care for the sick and the poor 
that stretches back for centuries. St. Michael’s offers this “Affirmation 
Statement” of its inclusivity:
To acknowledge the needs of the communities we serve, St. Michael’s 
reiterates our longstanding commitment to affirm and protect the right to 
accessible, inclusive, secure, and respectful health care for all patients, 
including people living with HIV/AIDS, lesbians and gay men, their 
partners and families, the poor, the homeless, persons with disabilities 
and people with mental illnesses. It is the mission and tradition of St. 
Michael’s to provide compassionate care in a welcoming environment, 
embracing all races, cultures, classes, beliefs, ages, genders and sexual 
orientations.100 
This Affirmation Statement echoes back to the religious foundation of 
hospitals as ministries to the poor and vulnerable, a powerful and laudable 
history for Catholic institutions. 
Despite this legacy, it is difficult to reconcile this Affirmation Statement 
with an argument that the hospital is operating in accordance with a 
religious purpose. The roots of care may well be informed by a religious 
tradition, but the purpose of a hospital in a modern health-care context 
is guided by scientific research, professional norms, non-discrimination, 
economics, and broad public policy goals. Compassion, spiritual support, 
and care for the vulnerable and sick are a significant part of what a faith-
influenced hospital strives to deliver, but its purpose is more strongly 
aligned with that of secular hospitals—to provide the most advanced, 
efficient, cutting-edge treatment with professionalism, science and ethical 
health policy at the centre.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Catholicism holds the sanctity 
of life as a foundational spiritual belief. Faith-influenced hospitals may 
argue that this basic premise is at the core of their ethos on best practices 
in providing medical care. The sanctity of life could be an operating or 
guiding principle of how health care is organized and delivered in these 
institutions. If the minority test fashioned in Loyola is taken up by a 
future court decision, and if the Court relies on an interpretation of the 
100. “Affirmation Statement” (2019), online: St. Michael’s Hospital <www.stmichaelshospital.com> 
[https://perma.cc/822N-G5PJ].
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test that focuses on how consistently an institution operates within its 
stated purpose, faith-influenced hospitals may be legally strengthened in 
their insistence to a right to deny MAiD on their premises for religious or 
conscientious reasons.
In the Carter hearing before the Supreme Court, some religious 
intervenors put forward a variant of this position. The Catholic Health 
Alliance of Canada (the Alliance) argued: 
“Faith-based health-care institutions are, by their very nature, religious. 
They are confessional. They are founded on religious principles by 
religious individuals, leaders, organizations or orders for expressly 
religious purposes. Faith-based health-care institutions, such as 
those represented by the Alliance, are extensions of the Church and 
manifestations of a religious community.”101 
The Alliance further argued that there is no difference between the 
Catholic institution and the individuals who serve in it.102 It is clear 
from the intervenor facta in Carter on this point that Catholic hospital 
bodies anticipated a future need to take an institutional stand on the issue. 
Resolving the question might require the Supreme Court to take a firm 
position on whether and when institutions can claim a section 2(a) right. It 
would also have to decide whether a faith-influenced hospital is, as Loyola 
College was, operating within a primarily religious purpose..
3. Reconciling competing rights
In order to assess the scope of impact of an objecting physician and/
or institution, one must envision a hypothetical challenge. How will 
this issue get to court to be resolved on a judicial level? There are two 
likely scenarios. The first sees an objecting physician bringing a Charter 
challenge to effective referral obligations promulgated by a provincial 
regulatory authority, as has already happened in Ontario in the unsuccessful 
bid to overturn a College of Physicians and Surgeons policy requiring 
an effective referral.103 This kind of challenge by a physician involves 
a proactive freedom of religion claim, with the responding regulatory 
authority justifying the government position as a reasonable limit. Patients 
are third parties with no formal role in the legal process. 
Another way this issue could get to court would be by way of a patient 
admitted to a faith-influenced institution and then forced into a transfer 
because of a refusal to perform MAiD.  This kind of challenge brings 
101. Carter, supra note 1 (Factum of the Catholic Health Alliance at para 27), online: <www.scc-csc.
ca> [https://perma.cc/XTN6-SJX7].
102. Ibid at para 26.
103. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65.
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patient interests front and centre as the institution would be defending on 
the grounds of religious freedom. This would raise an interesting dilemma 
for a provincial government. In the provision of medical services, 
hospitals are considered government entities, as they deliver a publicly-
funded service.104 The government therefore would need to take a position 
on whether it supports a faith-influenced institution’s religious freedom in 
refusing to provide MAiD. If it did not support the institution’s view on 
this, it could intervene in the court challenge, but would need to indicate 
its preferred remedy. As a party or intervenor, the government would be 
limited by the dictates of state neutrality as set out in Saguenay, which is 
outlined above.105 This kind of case has yet to materialize.
Either scenario asks courts to grapple with the reconciliation of 
competing Charter rights. Patients have section 7, section 15 and section 
2(a) rights to legally-available and appropriate medical treatment. Security 
of the person encompasses not only bodily integrity but also protects 
patients from undue state-imposed psychological stress. The denial of 
treatment that is clinically warranted undoubtedly qualifies as a violation 
of security of the person. Section 15 dictates that patients not face 
discrimination based on their disability, which could extend to a denial 
of MAiD on moral or ethical grounds leaving a person with a disability 
with no choice but to continue suffering. Finally, as Justice Wilson noted 
in Morgentaler, patients have section 2(a) freedom of conscience rights 
when it comes to making decisions of profound and private importance. 
The choice to die has to be one of the most profound decisions of one’s life. 
It is for the patient’s conscience to dictate the choice, not the physician’s. 
And yet, the practice of medicine puts physicians in difficult positions 
when patients want to pursue options that a physician thinks are immoral 
or unethical. We expect medical professionals to act with professionalism 
and compassion, and some physicians strongly believe that these qualities 
include practicing according to a set of religious or conscientious beliefs 
or values. The reconciliation of patient and physician rights is no easy task.
The Supreme Court’s leading case on the reconciliation of competing 
Charter rights is R v NS106 which considered when, if ever, a witness 
must remove a niqab when testifying. The Court characterized the issue 
as requiring an assessment of two competing Charter rights: section 2(a) 
freedom of religion (for the witness) and the right to make full answer 
104. Eldridge, supra note 60 at para 51.
105. Saguenay, supra note 53.
106. 2012 SCC 72 [NS]. 
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and defence (for the accused), protected by sections 7 and 11(d).107 The 
majority noted, “our jurisprudence teaches that clashes between rights 
should be approached by reconciling the rights through accommodation if 
possible, and in the end, if a conflict cannot be avoided, by case-by-case 
balancing.”108 In justifying a contextual approach instead of a strict rule, 
the majority argued “[t]he need to accommodate and balance sincerely held 
religious beliefs against other interests is deeply entrenched in Canadian 
law.  For over half a century this tradition has served us well. To depart 
from it would set the law down a new road, with unknown twists and 
turns.”109 In NS, accommodation of religious rights led to the requirement 
of a hearing in every case on whether the salutary effects of making a 
witness remove a niqab outweigh the deleterious effects. The reasoning 
of the majority emphasized the historic and present-day importance of 
religion and the primacy of accommodation. The case suggests that a 
failure to accommodate religion in the face of a competing Charter claim 
will only be countenanced if there is no compromise position. Freedom of 
religion is not to be easily sacrificed, even where there are vital interests 
in the balance. 
In the context of MAiD, the NS framework requires legislators and 
courts to give real effect to conscientious objection. It also provides some 
guidance in fulfilling this deceptively simple statement in Carter: “we 
underline that the Charter rights of patients and physicians will need to 
be reconciled.”110 In lay terms, the dictionary definition of “reconcile” 
offers: “to make consistent or congruous.”111 Synonyms include conciliate, 
conform, coordinate, harmonize.112 The key in other words is the balancing 
of two interests to come to a mutual solution. Full access to MAiD (for 
those who qualify) must co-exist with the rights of physicians who do 
not want to participate in the process. Provincial regulatory bodies, the 
Colleges, have all endeavoured to strike the appropriate balance, as 
discussed above. The more difficult compromise centers on institutional 
objections which operate more like bans than accommodation. It is beyond 
the purview of the legal analysis offered here to engage with the complex 
ethical literature on MAiD. Is is notable however that scholars in that field 
107. Ibid at para 7.
108. Ibid at para 52. The majority relied on the precedent case Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835, 120 DLR (4th) 12, further refined in R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76. 
109. NS supra note 106 at para 54.
110. Carter, supra note 1 at para 132.
111. “Reconcile” (2019), online: Merriam-Webster <www.merriam-webster.com> [https://perma.cc/
PFP4-D9BW].
112. “Thesaurus: Reconcile” (2019), online: Merriam-Webster <www.merriam-webster.com> 
[https://perma.cc/GUZ5-P789].
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argue much more work should be done to consider what an appropriate 
response might be to conscientious or religious objectors: 
An important feature of ethical reasoning is to make explicit absolute 
moral duties that are mutually exclusive through consideration of all 
the values, rights, and duties involved in an ethical decision. From our 
analysis it appears that there are at least two conflicting duties for any 
conscientious objector to MAID: 1) the duty to respect the patient’s right 
to life, liberty and security of the person, and 2) the freedom of religion or 
conscience. The moral difficulty is that simply asserting a conscientious 
objection to MAID does not automatically justify the normative 
conclusion that this conscientious objection should be respected. The 
assertion of a conscientious objection is simply the acknowledgement 
that there are conflicting duties.113
The Supreme Court decision in Law Society of British Columbia v 
Trinity Western University offers additional helpful guidance in assessing 
whether an institution might be able to claim freedom of conscience and 
religion rights.114 Trinity Western University (TWU) is an evangelical 
Christian post-secondary institution that wants to open a law school. As a 
condition of admission, it requires its students and faculty to adhere to a 
religiously-based code of conduct, the Community Covenant Agreement 
(Covenant), which prohibits “sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness 
of marriage between a man and a woman.”115 The Covenant would prohibit 
same sex intimacy and sex outside of marriage throughout the three years 
of law school, even when students are off-campus in the privacy of their 
own homes. The professional regulator in British Columbia voted not to 
accredit TWU as an approved law school because of the Covenant. The 
university responded with a challenge to this decision as a violation of its 
section 2(a) rights.116 
In assessing the section 2(a) claim, the Court found it unnecessary 
to consider whether TWU possesses an institutional right to Charter 
113. Timothy Christie, John Sloan, Dylan Dahlgren & Fred Koning, “Medical Assistance in Dying 
in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections” (2016) 5 Bioéthique 
Online 1 at 6. The authors conclude: “Given this ethical dilemma, professional organizations like 
the Catholic Health Association, the Canadian Medical Association, and the Federal, Provincial, 
Territorial, Expert Group on Physician Assisted Dying should complete their work. To date, they have 
simply articulated one side of the argument, deriving a normative conclusion without any normative 
justification. Furthermore, they have proposed a pragmatic solution that attempts to generate a “win-
win” situation for everyone. Unfortunately, the result of this pragmatism is that the ethical dilemma 
remains unanalyzed” (ibid at 9). 
114. 2018 SCC 32 [TWU].
115. Trinity Western University v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 518 at para 23 
[TWU v LSUC].
116. Trinity Western University v Law Society of British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 2326 at para 1.
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protection.117 The majority offered this observation as to the scope of 
protection offered by the Charter: “[f]or many religions, community 
is critical to manifesting faith. Whether through communal worship, 
religious education, or good works, the community is often the public 
face of religion. In other words, it is how the religion engages with the 
world.”118 Notably however, the majority concluded:
While acknowledging this communal aspect, I underscore that religious 
freedom is premised on the personal volition of individual believers. 
Although religious communities may adopt their own rules and 
membership requirements, the foundation of the community remains the 
voluntary choice of individual believers to join together on the basis of 
their common faith. Therefore, in the context of this appeal, I would 
decline to find that TWU, as an institution, possesses rights under s. 2(a). 
I note that, even if TWU did possess such rights, these would not extend 
beyond those held by the individual members of the faith community.119
There are two important aspects to this conclusion in assessing whether 
section 2(a) protects institutional rights. First, the majority is careful to 
specify that its conclusion is made “in the context of this appeal.” This 
leaves open the question of whether a different set of facts might warrant 
a broader institutional rights approach. 
Second, the majority suggests that even institutional rights would 
not extend “beyond those held by the individual members of the faith 
community.”120 Both Loyola and TWU are educational institutions with a 
mission to serve students who choose those schools in part because of their 
shared religious convictions. Both schools incorporate religious teachings 
117. TWU, supra note 114 at para 61.
118. Ibid at para 217.
119. Ibid at para 219. The dissenting judgments had this to say about institutional Charter protections: 
“While it may not be necessary to determine whether TWU, qua institution, enjoys a right to religious 
freedom in its own right for the purposes of this appeal…in our view, ensuring full protection for 
the ‘constitutionally protected communal aspects of…religious beliefs and practice’ requires more 
than simply aggregating individual rights claims under the amorphous umbrella of an institution’s 
‘community’....That being said, for the purposes of this appeal we adopt the majority’s description of 
the rights-holder as the ‘TWU community’” (ibid at para 315). 
120. Ibid at para 219. The majority’s comment seems to reject the “moral-association” account of 
institutional conscience. In her paper, “Identifying the Institutional Religious Freedom Claimant” 
(2018) 95:3 Can Bar Rev 707, Kathryn Chan canvasses two competing accounts of institutional 
conscience that could justify extending 2(a) freedom to institutions. The first, “mission-operation 
theory,” understands an institution as having a conscience that is expressed through its mission 
and structure. The second, “moral-association theory” sees institutions as the means through which 
individuals express their moral convictions. Without endorsing the approach, Chen concludes that the 
“moral-association” theory provides a stronger basis for a constitutional claim, noting that the Loyola 
decision seems to reveal the SCC’s preference for a “mission-operation” theory. For further discussion 
on conceptions of corporations and institutional freedom of religion claims, see Howard Kislowicz, 
“Business Corporations as Religious Freedom Claimants in Canada” (2017) 51:2-3 RJT 337.
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as a core component of the design of curriculum, the admission of students, 
and the overall educational mission. In considering a challenge to MAiD, 
hospitals do not share the same kind of cohesive, religiously-based mission 
as private educational institutions. They are not made up of a uniform 
staff, nor do they serve a primarily religious constituency. Patients do not 
necessarily (and perhaps even rarely) choose their hospital based on its 
religious affiliations. The difference between a private school and a public 
hospital might be stark enough to warrant a different conclusion as to 
whether section 2(a) protection extends to hospitals, even if the Supreme 
Court conclusively decides that in some situations institutions can claim 
freedom of religion.
On the other hand, the dissenting judgment in TWU may be influential 
if a case arises that squarely addresses institutional rights. The dissent 
noted the difficulty in adjudicating cases involving competing rights and 
was critical of the framework established by Justice Abella’s decision in 
Loyola.121 The dissent argued that conflicting rights cases are challenging 
because “the stakes for parties are sometimes not fully appreciable by 
those who do not share their experiences.”122 The dissent was particularly 
concerned about a framework that suggested that Charter values have an 
as important, even equal, position to Charter rights in analysis. The dissent 
argued: “[w]e are in agreement with the Chief Justice and our colleague 
Rowe J. that Charter values do not receive independent protection under the 
Charter. In our view, and for several reasons, resorting to Charter values 
as a counterweight to constitutionalized and judicially defined Charter 
rights is a highly questionable practice.”123 To the extent that a case on 
faith-influenced hospitals is framed as a contest between an institutional 
freedom of religion right versus Charter values around equality of access 
to publicly-funded care, it could be that a Court is more sympathetic to a 
specific rights claim. It would be important then for challengers to argue 
that there are specific Charter rights in opposition to any claimed by 
faith-influenced institutions. Patients and their physicians have Charter 
conscience rights for example, to determine the path of care with legally 
available options. Patients have equality rights not to be discriminated 
against on the basis of their own religious or conscientious beliefs that 
permit MAiD. 
Loyola and TWU offer important yet ambiguous guidance to provinces 
as they grapple with what advice and/or direction to give faith-influenced 
121. TWU, supra note 114 at para 266.
122. Ibid at para 264.
123. Ibid at para 307.
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institutions on the issue of MAiD. While it may be a fair compromise for 
a professional regulatory body to allow individual physicians to offer an 
effective referral (rather than compel performance) for services they object 
to on a conscience or religious basis, this is an inadequate accommodation 
for a hospital. Many faith-influenced institutions now take the position 
that they will transfer care to secular institutions for patients needing 
information about MAiD. In Ottawa, for example, the Bruyère Centre 
represents the largest palliative care provider in the city.124 Its refusal to 
allow MAiD to be performed on premises requires patients to leave the 
institution to find new places in which to die. Patients may also deny 
themselves access to crucial palliative care for fear of being trapped in 
an institution that will not perform MAiD, if their situation worsens or 
becomes intolerable. These are cruel choices for patients constitutionally 
entitled to access this medical service. It is one thing for patients (and their 
families) to adapt to a new non-objecting physician. It is another thing 
entirely to have to move institutions, encounter an entirely new staff, and 
possibly end up further from support systems and family members. Some 
patients will find the transfer physically challenging or impossible.125 
Further, given that staff at faith-influenced institutions like Bruyère 
are not necessarily Catholic, or not necessarily objecting to MAiD, it is 
arguably an infringement on their medical judgment and sense of ethics 
and conscience to deny them the opportunity to provide a service they 
may have a profound sense is appropriate and clinically warranted in 
the circumstances. It is true that not all hospitals perform all procedures. 
Specialized centres are common in larger cities and doctors with particular 
talents may attract patients who travel for difficult procedures. MAiD is 
not clinically difficult and it is not expensive.126 It is hard to conceive of a 
hospital that is not clinically competent to provide MAiD. In any event, the 
argument that hospitals should be allowed to specialize is one grounded 
in efficiency and competence, and the same rationales do not apply to 
a refusal to provide services for religious or conscientious reasons.127 It 
124. Elizabeth Payne, “Ottawa’s Biggest Palliative Care Hospital says it Won’t Offer Assisted 
Dying,” Ottawa Citizen (29 February 2016), online: <www.ottawacitizen.com> [https://perma.cc/
E2A9-L6KA]. 
125. See e.g. Tom Blackwell, “B.C. Man Faced Excruciating Transfer After Catholic Hospital 
Refused Assisted Death Request,” National Post (27 September 2016), online: <www.nationalpost.
com> [https://perma.cc/DE36-V9TA]; Chris Purdy, “Patient has Assisted-Death Assessment on 
Sidewalk Outside Catholic Hospital in Edmonton,” The Globe and Mail (23 October 2018), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com> [https://perma.cc/H59Y-V7VS].
126. See Aaron J Trachtenberg & Braden Manns, “Cost Analysis of Medical Assistance in Dying 
in Canada” (2017) 189:3 CMAJ E101 at E103. The authors found the cost of the medications 
administered during MAiD to be as little as $25.40. 
127. Shaad and Shaad, supra note 5 at 214, argue that there are legitimate non-conscience reasons 
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would be a novel but interesting claim for a non-objecting physician with 
privileges at a faith-influenced institution to argue a violation of section 
2(a) Charter rights for an inability to follow his or her conscience in the 
practice of medicine. A claimant could reasonably articulate a sincere 
belief that patients should be allowed the autonomy and dignity of a death 
of their own choosing. This has been argued in the United Kingdom in 
scholarly writing on the impact of the Carter decision for MAiD and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Adenitire argues that 
section 9 of the ECHR (which protects freedom of conscience and religion) 
might offer protection against criminal prosecution for an assisted death as, 
“[i]n fact, it is entirely plausible that a doctor may provide assistance in dying 
to a non-related person, not for personal gain, and out of a conscientious 
conviction that assisted dying is not only morally permissible but, in some 
tragic cases and when explicitly requested, morally required.”128 Since 
MAiD is legal in Canada, a doctor who believes a patient to qualify, and 
facing that choice from the patient, suffers a non-trivial harm to his or her 
own conscience in having to deny that choice.129 A physician in a faith-
influenced institution could be entitled to protection as a conscientious 
provider.
IV. Equality and freedom of religion: protecting the vulnerable
In any discussion of either individual or institutional freedom of religion 
rights and MAiD, the equality rights of patients should also be considered. 
The equality claims of physicians in the CPSO case were raised but not 
seriously addressed in argument, and were unsuccessful at both levels 
for an institution not to offer MAiD: “First, institutional non‐participation is an issue of institutional 
self‐governance, not conscience. Second, there are many reasons unrelated to conscience for which a 
health centre may legitimately decide to not offer a particular procedure. Institutional non‐participation 
isn’t primarily, let alone exclusively, about conscience. We already recognize institutional self‐
governance in part—as when we say the government should fund, but not dictate, scientific research at 
universities—but we could do so more fully by recognizing an institutional right of non‐participation 
for health centres.” I have no quarrel with their second observation but maintain that in most if not all 
faith-influenced institutions, MAiD is within the competence of staff. An argument that an institution 
is incapable of offering MAiD is very different from arguing it is unwilling. 
128. John Adenitire, “A Conscience-Based Human Right to be ‘Doctor Death’” (2016) 4 Public L 613 
at 617. 
129. In an example from North Bay, Ontario, a four-doctor team of MAiD providers sent a letter to 
the Nippising Serenity Hospice denouncing the publically-funded hospice’s refusal to allow MAiD in 
the facility. The doctors wrote “We absolutely disagree with you that MAiD ‘is not one of the tools in 
the palliative care basket.’ It is in fact a tool—a very special, humane tool that thousands of Canadians 
have accessed and the Canadian government, under law, has permitted….The four of us pride ourselves 
on being compassionate physicians that understand, respect, and try our absolute professional and 
personal best to provide compassionate end of life care to our own and other physicians’ patients in 
our community.” See Chris Dawson “Local Doctors Question Hospice’s Stance on Assisted Death,” 
BayToday (29 January 2020), online: <baytoday.ca> [perma.cc/TT57-6HMY].
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of court.130 At the Supreme Court, section 15 did not play a significant 
part in the Court’s decision in TWU, though both the Law Society and 
some intervenors argued that a decision to accredit the proposed law 
school would have significant ramifications for LGBTQ students. At the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in TWU, Justice MacPherson made two valuable 
observations on how to approach the balancing of Charter interests that 
might be useful in the MAiD context. He pointed out that the Charter 
analysis should take a different approach when religious freedom impacts 
the equality rights of others, and he noted that a degree of interference 
with religious freedom may be necessary in the public interest to promote 
equality.131 The dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada was critical of 
this approach and argued: “[w]hat is troubling, however, is the imposition 
of judicially preferred ‘values’ to limit constitutionally protected rights, 
including the right to hold other values.”132 The fact that the dissenting 
judges described constitutional equality rights only as values in 
juxtaposition to freedom of religion and conscience is concerning. As 
argued above, the traditional approach to section 2(a) claims may need to 
be rethought when the clear interests of a third-party are at stake. In the 
MAiD context, the rights of the patient stand in sharp contrast to the rights 
of a physician and/or institution in a freedom of conscience and religion 
claim. The equality rights of patients are not just values to be sacrificed to 
conscience and religious rights. 
The trial judge in the Carter case found a violation of section 15 in the 
criminal prohibitions on assisted death.133 Justice Lynn Smith concluded 
that the Criminal Code provisions discriminated on the enumerated 
section 15 ground of disability. They imposed a “more burdensome” effect 
on those with physical disabilities which led to a loss of capacity, whose 
only option for suicide was to refuse food and water.134 Non-disabled 
people could choose less painful and stark options. She concluded: 
“[the Criminal Code provision] perpetuates and worsens a disadvantage 
experienced by persons with disabilities. The dignity of choice should 
be afforded to Canadians equally, but the law as it stands does not do so 
with respect to this ultimately personal and fundamental choice.”135 She 
poignantly describes the impact of the equality violation: 
130. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at paras 5, 94.
131. TWU v LSUC, supra note 115 at paras 100, 142.
132. TWU supra note 114 at para 308.
133. Carter v Canada, 2012 BCSC 886.
134. Ibid at para 1077.
135. Ibid at para 1161.
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The effect of the distinction is felt particularly acutely by a subset of 
persons with physical disabilities…persons who are grievously and 
irremediably ill and physically disabled or will soon become so, are 
mentally competent, have full cognitive capacity, and wish to have a 
measure of control over their circumstances at the end of their lives. They 
may not wish to experience prolonged pain. They may wish to avoid the 
anxiety that comes with fear that future pain will become unbearable at 
a time when they are helpless. They may not wish to undergo palliative 
sedation without hydration or nutrition for reasons including concern 
for their families, fear for themselves or reaction against the total loss of 
independence at the end of their lives.136
The Supreme Court of Canada decided the Carter case on section 
7 grounds and so declined to address the equality violation as it was 
unnecessary to the resolution. In the Rodriguez decision, then Chief 
Justice Lamer was the only judge to consider section 15, and like Justice 
Smith at trial in Carter years later, he found a violation. It is a strong 
argument that there are equality issues at stake for patients denied access 
to MAiD. The Supreme Court may well have to address more specifically 
the section 15 equality impact of denying or limiting access to MAiD. 
The consultations to expand access to new categories (e.g. where mental 
illness is the sole underlying condition, mature minors, advance request 
etc.) will raise new and important equality concerns.137 
In considering whether to expand access to MAiD—including by 
requiring effective referral models and denying institutions the right 
to refuse to provide the service—the Court should be sensitive to the 
material, symbolic and dignitary harms implicated by a denial of access. 
The material or practical harms of a refusal to effectively refer (or of a 
regulatory regime that does not require effective referral) is that a patient 
is left without clear information and options-counselling and access. 
Physicians who object to discussing MAiD on conscientious or religious 
grounds, and who are not obligated to facilitate that discussion with a 
colleague, leave a vulnerable, fragile patient, and their no doubt distraught 
family, without adequate information as to the legal services available to 
end suffering. A patient may well opt not to access MAiD. The patient, 
fully informed, may decide on palliative options for pain management. 
However, a cancer patient in treatment whose trusted oncologist will not 
136. Ibid at para 1159.
137.  In 2019, the Superior Court of Québec found that requirement under s 241.2(2)(d) of the 
Criminal Code that an individual’s natural death has become reasonably forseeable violates s 7 of 
the Charter and cannot be justified under s 1 (see Truchon, supra note 3). In response to Truchon, 
the federal government introduced Bill C-7 which seeks to expand acess to MAiD by removing the 
requirement that natural death has become reasonably forseeable and by allowing individuals to sign 
advanced directives prioir to becoming incapable. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical 
assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 24 February 2020).
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facilitate information provision on MAiD, or a frail resident of a senior’s 
home whose in-house physician will not engage in the conversation or 
pave the way for it, leave patients with a severe material harm to their 
security of the person and life. 
There are also serious dignitary harms in not requiring an effective 
referral protocol.138 The clear message is that there is something wrong with 
the decision to die by choice. There is no doubt that a religious leader could 
offer counsel and advice that in the Catholic faith, for example, suicide is 
a sin. Religious leaders would certainly be free to counsel parishioners 
against this choice. Physicians in Canada are secular professionals. Their 
personal opinions as to what is the best option for themselves (or perhaps 
their own family members who ask for familial, not professional counsel) 
are irrelevant to a medical judgment. A generous view might allow that, 
for an objecting physician, medical judgment as to MAiD (or abortion 
or contraception) is impossible to separate from the serious religious or 
conscientious view that those services are incompatible with medicine. 
That is a strong justification for non-compellability. (As a practical matter, 
other than in urgent circumstances, it is likely few patients would want 
an objecting physician to provide the service.) The same considerations 
are not as implicated in effective referral models. Yet a physician’s 
judgement at a time of great vulnerability, and around decisions that even 
when freely arrived at and autonomously chosen are still difficult and 
profound decisions, carries great dignitary harm to the patients. For some 
patients, MAiD (and abortion) are inevitable choices, borne of egregious 
circumstances that few would “choose” to be in. An autonomous choice 
to access the service is not the same as a celebration of the decision. 
Permitting physicians not to refer to non-objecting colleagues, for the 
provision of accurate and compassionate information and options, leaves 
patients feeling ignorant, stigmatized and possibly ashamed. As Justice 
Strathy concluded in the CPSO case, this dignatory harm raises serious 
equality issues for patients, and led his Court to find that effective referral 
is a minimally impairing limit on freedom of religion.
138. As NeJaime & Siegel argue, supra note 69 at 201, “Conscience-based refusals can obstruct 
access to services and to information about alternative providers, and they can inflict dignitary harm, 
as one citizen seeks an exemption from a legal duty to serve another on the ground that she believes 
her fellow citizen is sinning. For these reasons, we believe that conscience objections by those acting 
in professional roles should only be accommodated when the institution in which they are situated 
mitigates the material and dignitary effects on third parties. Accommodation regimes must be designed 
in such a way as to shield other citizens from the deprivations and denigrations that refusals can inflict. 
In settings where there is no feasible way of organizing a regime that can accomplish this, we are 
deeply skeptical of accommodation.” 
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Conclusion
MAiD offers the Supreme Court and legal academics a thought-provoking 
dilemma in the reconciliation of Charter rights. It is, however, so much more 
than a constitutional quandary. The decision to end one’s life is arguably 
the most profound decision any individual can make. The solemnity and 
power of that was recognized in Carter. The Court rose to the occasion in a 
decision that affirmed the core rights of the sick and dying to make choices 
for themselves. These decisions may be incredibly difficult, painful, and 
personal to the individual making them, and the families supporting that 
person. It is not a personal decision for the infrastructure tasked with 
helping the sick and dying. Institutions may be filled with people, but they 
are built of bricks and mortar. The institutions themselves should not take a 
moral stance on this complex social issue. They most certainly should not 
take an oppositional position to the Charter-protected rights of patients. 
Ideally, provincial governments across this country will appreciate their 
duty to be neutral on matters of conscience and religion and take strong 
leadership roles in making clear to publicly-funded institutions that they 
must not deny medical services solely on religious or conscientious 
grounds.139 Faith-influenced institutions have long skirted their obligations 
in the reproductive context, but that void is more easily filled by clinics. 
For patients who cannot receive MAiD in their own homes, institutions are 
needed to deliver it.
For individual physicians, the personal and often painful task of 
practicing medicine in keeping with one’s values and beliefs is more 
nuanced than the institutional position. It is unfair, and perhaps impossible 
to expect an individual physician to practice medicine in a way that 
139. There are at least two examples where provinces intervened in favour of patient access. First, in 
Antigonish, Nova Scotia, the Nova Scotia Health Authority ordered St. Martha’s Hospital to provide 
MAiD on site. It was able to do so in part because it owns the facility, though St. Martha’s is operating 
as a faith-influenced institution. MAiD is available at St. Martha’s in a designated space within the 
institution. See: Ross Lord & Alexander Quon, “NSHA Quietly Changes Medically Assisted Dying 
Policy at Catholic Hospital,” Global News (18 September 2019), online: <https://globalnews.ca/
news/5917973/nova-scotia-health-authority-st-marthas-regional-hospital-assisted-dying/> [https://
perma.cc/GCF5-Q5N8]. In Victoria, British Columbia the government took a strong stand against 
a faith-influenced hospice that refused to provide MAiD: “Health Minister Adrian Dix…instructed 
Fraser Health to stop paying $1.5 million annually to the Delta Hospice Society within the next 
year because it is violating federal law and B.C. government policy that requires medically assisted 
dying be made allowed at non-denominational facilities that receive more than half their funding 
from the province.” See: Rob Shaw, “Ladner Hospice to Lose B.C. Funding for Banning Medically 
Assisted Dying,” Vancouver Sun (26 February 2020), online: <https://vancouversun.com/news/local-
news/ladner-hospice-loses-provincial-funding-over-refusal-to-comply-with-maid/> [https://perma.
cc/6JQN-4JGN] and see See Agnieszka Ruck, “B.C. Delta Hospice Losing Funds Over Assisted 
Suicide,” the Catholic Register (27 February 2020), online: <catholicregister.org> [perma.cc/UG5Q-
BFXL].
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profoundly negates his or her own beliefs as to care. In the context of 
reproductive services like abortion or contraception, it is advisable that 
physicians choose practice areas that avoid the conflict.140 MAiD presents 
a more complicated set of circumstances. Many physicians, in diverse 
practice areas, could be confronted with a patient who wants and is eligible 
for MAiD. If we expand the criteria for access, it will be impossible for 
many physicians to avoid dealing with the issue by simply choosing a less-
fraught practice area. Effective referral is the best compromise to reconcile 
rights. Policies like those in Ontario must prevail to protect patient rights. 
The extent of complicity forced upon objecting physicians is a reasonable 
way to address conflicting rights. It presents an additional burden to 
patients as it forces them to consult a non-objecting physician. Still, both 
sides get some relief. 
It is unfortunate that MAiD may well end up back in the courts to 
work out these conflicts. The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in the 
CPSO case may offer some leverage in achieving stronger protections for 
patients in other provinces. It is a well-reasoned and unanimous decision, 
with compelling arguments as to the need for an effective referral model. 
Hopefully other provincial regulatory bodies will voluntarily adopt that 
model, rather than re-litigate the issue. It would be preferable for both 
governments and regulatory bodies to take strong leadership roles in 
advising institutions and physicians as to the proper limits of their ability 
to act in a religiously-motivated way in the secular provision of health 
care. Hopefully we do not need another Sue Rodriguez or Lee Carter or 
Gloria Taylor, Nicole Gladu, Jean Truchon, Julia Lamb to make clear what 
is at stake for those most vulnerable members of our society.
140. And at the very least, in Ontario they must make an effective referral to a non-objecting colleague. 
See CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 and see Gilbert, supra note 66.
696 The Dalhousie Law Journal
